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I. INTRODUCTION
During the 1989 term, the United States Supreme Court signifi-
cantly reduced the effectiveness of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964 and other civil rights legislation.1 Congress responded with the
1. See, eg., Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164 (1989) (holding that racial har-
assment during employment was not actionable under § 1981 since the reconstruction era statute
only covered conduct at the initial formation of the contract and conduct which interfered with the
right to enforce contractual obligations in the courts); Lorance v. AT & T Tech., Inc., 490 U.S. 900
(1989) (holding that the filing time for a Title VII claim of discrimination based on a facially neutral
seniority system began running at the time of the adoption of the seniority system, rather than a later
date of application of the seniority system to employees); Martin v. Wilks, 490 U.S. 755 (1989)
(holding that a group of white firefighters, who failed to intervene in earlier employment discrimina-
tion proceedings which approved consent decrees, could subsequently challenge employment deci-
sions made by government officials in accordance with the consent decrees). See generally Douglas
Laycock, Consent Decrees Without Consent: The Rights of Nonconsenting Third Parties, 1987 U.
CHI. LEGAL. F. 103 (1987); Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642 (1989) (holding that
statistical evidence demonstrating a high percentage of nonwhite workers in Wards Cove's cannery
jobs and a low percentage of such workers in the noncannery positions did not establish a prima facie
case of disparate impact under Title VII); Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989) (hold-
ing that a defendant could avoid liability for an employment decision based in part on an employee's
sex if the defendant showed by a preponderance of the evidence that the same employment decision
would have been made even if plaintiff's gender had not been taken into account). Mark S. Brodin,
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Civil Rights Act of 1990 (1990 CRA).2 President Bush vetoed the 1990
CRA and Congress failed to acquire a sufficient number of votes to over-
ride the President's veto. The Civil Rights Act of 1991 (1991 CRA),3
signed by President Bush on November 21, 1991, represents a compro-
mise between the Bush Administration and supporters of the original leg-
islation.4 The 1991 CRA amends Section 1981 of the Civil Rights Act of
1866;5 Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII);6 the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967;1 the Civil Rights Attorney's
Fees Award Act of 1976;8 and the Americans with Disabilities Act of
1990.9 This comment focuses on the ways in which the 1991 CRA in-
creases a Title VII employer's exposure to liability.
II. CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (1964 CRA)10 embraces
only a portion of the vast civil rights law contained in the Act. Titles I
through VI govern discrimination in restricting the right to vote, access
to public facilities and accommodations, educational settings, and pro-
grams assisted by the federal government.11 Title VII controls discrimi-
nation in the workplace. 12 Specifically, employers a are liable under Title
VII if they discriminate on the basis of race, color, national origin, sex, or
religion.14
Two types of employment discrimination claims are provided for
The Standard of Causation in the Mixed-Motive Title VIIAction: A Social Perspective, 82 COLUM. L.
REV. 292 (1982).
2. H.R. 856, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. (1990).
3. Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 2, 16, 29
and 42 U.S.C.A. (West Supp. 1992)).
4. Senators John Danforth, R-Mo., and Edward M. Kennedy, D-Mass., are credited for struc-
turing the final 1991 bill in a manner acceptable to sponsors of the 1990 CRA and the Bush Admin-
istration. See generally Julia C. Ross, New Civil Rights Act: Law Reverses Several Recent High Court
Decisions, 78 A.B.A. J. 85 (1992).
5. 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1988).
6. Id. § 2000e.
7. 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1988).
8. 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1988).
9. Id. §§ 12101-12213.
10. Id. § 2000e.
11. MACK A. PLAYER, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW § 5.01 (1988).
12. Id.
13. Employers subject to Title VII include those "engaged in an industry affecting commerce
who has fifteen or more employees for each working day in each of twenty or more calendar weeks in
the current or preceding year .... 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (1988).
14. Id. § 2000e-2.
[Vol. 28:131
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under Title VII: intentional discrimination and disparate impact.15 Re-
fusal to hire, discharge or discriminate with regard to compensation,
terms, conditions, or privileges of employment of an individual triggers
intentional discrimination suits.16 Facially neutral policies that have the
effect of limiting, segregating, or classifying employees or applicants
based on their race, color, religion, sex, or national origin provoke dispa-
rate impact suits.17 Sections III and IV of this comment examine how
the 1991 CRA alters each type of claim.
III. INTENTIONAL DISCRIMINATION SUITS
The 1991 CRA drastically increased the penalty employers pay for
intentionally discriminating against a member of a protected class. Dam-
ages recovered for intentional discrimination can extend beyond equita-
ble relief and backpay.18 Furthermore, a panel of jurors, rather than a
judge, determines the extent of damages to be awarded to a victim of
intentional discrimination. 19
A. Increased Damages
The 1964 CRA limited all Title VII plaintiffs to a recovery of
backpay and equitable relief.20 Prior to the 1991 CRA, compensatory
and punitive damages could only be collected by employment discrimina-
tion victims if their claim could be asserted under 42 U.S.C. § 1981.21
15. Id.
16. Id. § 2000e-2(a)(l).
17. Id. § 2000e-2(a)(2).
18. The intent of 42 U.S.C.A. § 1981a was summarized in a sponsors' interpretive memoran-
dum as creating "a new provision, to be codified in Section 1981A in Title 42 of the U.S. Code.
Section 1981A authorizes the award of compensatory and punitive damages in cases of intentional
employment discrimination against persons within the protected categories of Title VII and the
Americans with Disabilities Act." 137 CONG. REc. S15,484 (daily ed. Oct. 30, 1991) (statement of
Sen. Danforth).
19. 1991 CRA § 102(c), 105 Stat. at 1073 ("If a complaining party seeks compensatory or
punitive damages under this section-(l) any party may demand a trial by jury; and (2) the court shall
not inform the jury of the limitations described in subsection (b)(3)."). The limitations referred to in
§ 102(b)(3) cap the amount of money a jury may award for compensatory and punitive damages in
an intentional discrimination suit. Id. § 102(b)(3), 105 Stat. at 1073.
20. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (1988).
21. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) previously restricted damages to only backpay and equitable relief.
Section 1981 does not contain a similar damages restriction. Therefore, prior to the 1991 CRA,
compensatory and punitive damages for employment discrimination could only be achieved under
§ 1981. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 2000e-5(g) (1988).
1992]
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Section 1981 provides protection from race, ethnic, or ancestry discrimi-
nation.22 In contrast, under the 1991 CRA, employees intentionally dis-
criminated against on the basis of race, sex, color, religion, or national
origin may recover both compensatory and punitive damages in addition
to equitable relief.23 Employees suffering discrimination in the form of
disparate impact, as opposed to intentional discrimination, remain lim-
ited to backpay and equitable relief.24
The 1991 CRA prevents intentional discrimination plaintiffs from
receiving double recovery under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 and Title VII.25 In-
ability to recover under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 is required in order to bring a
Title VII claim under the 1991 CRA.26 However, the plaintiff is not
required to actually prove that a cause of action does not exist under 42
U.S.C. § 1981.27
The double recovery prohibition does not prevent a plaintiff from
asserting both a section 1981 claim and a Title VII claim if the discrimi-
nation produced "demonstrably different" harm.28 In an interpretive
memorandum of the 1991 CRA, Senator Danforth gave the example of a
woman who suffers both racial discrimination and sexual harassment in
employment, but suffers a different type of harm from each. She would
be able to bring a section 1981 claim for racial discrimination and a Title
VII claim for sexual harassment and recover for each.29
The 1991 CRA limits the dollar amount a plaintiff alleging inten-
tional discrimination can collect for punitive and compensatory dam-
ages.30 The cap depends on the number of persons employed by an
employer during the current or preceding year. The larger the number of
22. Id. § 1981.
23. 1991 CRA § 102(a)(1), 105 Stat. at 1072.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. 137 CONG. REc. S15,484 (daily ed. Oct. 30, 1991).
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. 1991 CRA § 102(b)(3), 105 Stat. at 1073. Section 102(b)(3) of the 1991 CRA reads as
follows:
Limitations.-The sum of the amount of compensatory damages awarded under this sec-
tion for future pecuniary losses, emotional pain, suffering, inconvenience, mental anguish,
loss of enjoyment of life, and other nonpecuniary losses, and the amount of punitive dam-
ages awarded under this section, shall not exceed, for each complaining party-
(A) in the case of a respondent who has more than 14 and fewer than 101 employees
in each of 20 or more calendar weeks in the current or preceding calendar year, $50,000;
(B) in the case of respondent who has more than 100 and fewer than 201 employees in
each of 20 or more calendar weeks in the current or preceding calendar year, $100,000; and
(C) in the case of a respondent who has more than 200 and fewer than 501 employees
[Vol. 28:131
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employees, the higher the cap.31 The 1991 CRA exposes employers with
more than 500 employees to the most liability, $300,000.32
The structure of the damage caps provides some employers with an
opportunity to limit their exposure to liability. For example, a corpora-
tion with 505 employees can limit its exposure to $100,000 with the elim-
ination of only five employees.33 Employers close to the cutting line for
any of the caps could achieve similar results. The 1991 CRA categorizes
employers based on the current or preceding calendar year.34 Therefore,
reductions in exposure would not occur for two calendar years.35
Exposure to liability could also be limited through fragmentation.
Larger corporations could reduce exposure by forming smaller, separate
companies employing fewer than 101 employees. The 1991 CRA exposes
employers with fewer than 101 employees to the least amount of liability,
$50,000.36 In order for a reorganization maneuver to be successful, the
smaller companies must actually operate as separate companies.3" Prior
in each of 20 or more calendar weeks in the current or preceding calendar year, $200,000;
and
(D) in the case of a respondent who has more than 500 employees in each of 20 or
more calendar weeks in the current or preceding calendar year, $300,000.
Id.
The caps on damages found in § 102(bX3) may be removed from the 1991 CRA in the future.
First, Sen. Kennedy and Sen. Hatch introduced bills which would remove these limitations. David
A. Cathcart & Mark Snyderman, The Civil Rights Act of 1991, THE CIVIL RIGHTS AcT OF 1991 1,
13 (A.L.I.-A.B.A. Video Law Review Study Materials 1992). Second, some experts argue the opera-
tion of the caps will prove unconstitutional. Id. Section 102(c) requires that jury members not be
informed of the damages limitations. 1991 CRA § 102(c), 105 Stat. at 1073. Therefore, a jury may
return an award exceeding one of the limits, but the court would be forced to apply the cap. In such
a case, the successful plaintiff suing a smaller employer will argue the cap violates the equal protec-
tion and due process rights of the Constitution. Plaintiffs suing smaller employers would be penal-
ized due to the size of their employer. A victim of intentional discrimination by an employer with
more than 500 employees is not likely to have suffered any greater harm than a victim of intentional
discrimination by an employer with less than 500 employees. Cathcart & Snyderman, supra, at 30.
However, under the 1991 CRA, the plaintiff suing the smaller employer would receive anywhere
from $100,000 to $250,000 less than the plaintiff suing the larger employer. 1991 CRA § 102(bX3),
105 Stat. at 1073. Defendants will also likely challenge the caps found in the 1991 CRA as unconsti-
tutional. For example, large employers will argue the mere size of their company should not expose
them to greater liability. Cathcart & Snyderman, supra, note 30.
31. 1991 CRA § 102(b)(3), 105 Stat. at 1073.
32. Id. § 102(b)(3)(D), 105 Stat. at 1073.
33. Id. §§ 102(bX3)(C) - (D), 105 Stat. at 1073.
34. Id. § 102(b)(3), 105 Stat. at 1073.
35. Id.
36. Id. § 102(b)(3)(A), 105 Stat. at 1073.
37. In Radio Union v. Broadcast, 380 U.S. 255 (1965) (per curiam), the Supreme Court ap-
proved a four-part test for determining when distinct legal entities may be considered an integrated
enterprise or "single employer":
(1) Interrelationship of operations;
(2) Common management, "directors and boards";
(3) Centralized control of labor relations; and
5
Baker: Title VII Litigation under the Civil Rights Act of 1991
Published by TU Law Digital Commons, 1992
TULSA LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 28:131
to the 1991 CRA, attorneys for victims of Title VII discrimination com-
monly attempted to link smaller companies to larger corporations in or-
der to reach the deeper pocket.3" Under the 1991 CRA, plaintiff
attorneys will perform similar examinations of segmented companies
with fewer than 501 employees in an effort to maximize the amount of
damages available.
Awards made under the 1991 CRA for backpay, interest on
backpay, and equitable relief are not included when calculating the caps
for compensatory and punitive damages.3 9 The caps imposed by the
1991 CRA do not affect section 1981 causes of action. The availability of
unlimited compensatory and punitive damages still operates with regard
to section 1981 actionsY°
B. Right to Trial by Jury
Plaintiffs pursuing any lawsuit desire a trial by jury for two reasons:
(1) juries are generally perceived as more sympathetic, 4 1 and (2) juries
return larger awards than judges.42 According to some studies, an award
by a jury will, on average, double what a judge would award.43 The equi-
table remedies limitation found in Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
(4) Common ownership "or financial control".
See Baker v. Stuart Broadcasting Co., 560 F.2d 389, 392 (8th Cir. 1977); Metropolitan Detroit
Bricklayers v. J.E. Hoetger & Co., 672 F.2d 580, 584 (6th Cir. 1982). In some cases, "single em-
ployer" status can be shown without meeting all four prongs of the test. Armbruster v. Quinn, 711
F.2d 1332, 1338 (6th Cir. 1983); Local No. 627, Operating Engineers v. NLRB, 518 F.2d 1040,
1045-46 (D.C. Cir. 1975), aff'd in relevant part sub nom. South Prairie Construction Co. v. Local
627, Operating Engineers, 425 U.S. 800 (1976). See generally Soule Glass and Glazing Co. v.
NLRB, 652 F.2d 1055, 1075-76 (lst Cir. 1981).
38. Id
39. Id. § 102(b)(2), 105 Stat. at 1073 ("Compensatory damages awarded under this section
shall not include backpay, interest on backpay, or any other type of relief authorized under section
706(g) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.").
40. Id. § 102(b)(4), 105 Stat. at 1073 ('Nothing in this section shall be construed to limit the
scope of, or the relief available under, section 1977 of the Revised Statutes [42 U.S.C. 1981]."). An
interpretive memorandum by the sponsors of the 1991 CRA stressed the nonapplication of limits
found in the 1991 CRA to § 1981 claims:
The new damages provision thus does not limit either the amount of damages available in
section 1981 actions, or the circumstances under which a person may bring suit under this
section. For example, the bill does not affect the holding of the Supreme Court in Saint
Francis College v. AI-Khazraji, 481 U.S. 604 (1987), that section 1981 action was intended
to protect from discrimination "identifiable classes of persons who are subjected to inten-
tional discrimination solely because of their ancestry or ethnic characteristics." Indeed,
that discrimination is national origin discrimination prohibited by Title VII as well.
137 CONG. REc. S15,484 (daily ed. Oct. 30, 1991).
41. See generally JoHN GUINTHER, THE JURY IN AMERICA 169-96 (1988).
42. Id.
43. Id.
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1964 prevented jury trials."
The 1991 CRA allows Title VII plaintiffs alleging intentional dis-
crimination the advantage of trying their case to a jury.45 Right to a jury
trial is not provided for in disparate impact suits.46 Technically, the 1991
CRA allows either the defendant or plaintiff to elect a jury trial,47 but in
practice only plaintiffs will elect to exercise this right because juries gen-
erally return verdicts which are unfavorable to defendants.48
The availability of jury trials provides employee-plaintiffs with a sig-
nificant advantage over employers. Plaintiffs' settlement offers will now
be weighed by employers against how much a jury, rather than a judge,
might award. Employers will view juries as a wild card due to the diffi-
culty of predicting jury verdicts.49 Thus, some settlement offers not
given a second glance under the original CRA will now appear more
attractive to employers.
IV. DISPARATE IMPACT SurIs
A. Evidentiary Burdens Prior to the 1991 CRA
1. Griggs v. Duke Power Co.
In Griggs v. Duke Power Co.,5" the Supreme Court provided its first
interpretation of Title VII's "disparate impact section."51 A group of
black employees launched the Title VII class action suit against Duke
44. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (1988).
45. 1991 CRA § 102(c), 105 Stat. at 1073.
46. Id. §§ 102(b)(1) - (c), 105 Stat. at 1073.
47. Id.
48. See generally GUINTHER, supra note 39, at 169-96.
49. Id.
50. 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
51. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(2) (1988). The disparate impact section reads as follows:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to limit, segregate, or classify
his employees or applicants for employment in any way which would deprive or tend to
deprive any individual of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status
as an employee, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.
Id.
Section 2000e-2(a)(1) of Title VII prohibits intentional discrimination:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to fail or refuse to hire or to
discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect
to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such indi-
vidual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.
Id. § 2000e-2(a)(1).
1992]
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Power Company.52 The plaintiffs contended that certain company re-
quirements53 had a discriminatory impact on black employees.54
The Supreme Court began its analysis by reviewing Duke Power's
practices prior to the passage of the 1964 CRA.55 The evidence showed a
pattern of intentional discrimination against blacks. 6 Duke Power's
plant was divided into five departments: (1) labor, (2) coal handling, (3)
operations, (4) maintenance, and (5) laboratory. Of the five depart-
ments, employees assigned to the labor department received the lowest
wages. In fact, the highest paid employees in the labor department made
less than the lowest paid employees in the other departments.5" The evi-
dence clearly showed that Duke Power preferred whites when filling po-
sitions in the higher paying departments, while restricting blacks to the
labor department.59
Prior to 1965, Duke Power adhered to the following personnel pol-
icy, adopted in 1955, when hiring or transferring employees: (1) require-
ment of a high school education for initial employment in any
department, except labor, and (2) requirement of a high school education
in order to transfer from the coal handling department to the higher pay-
ing departments (operations, maintenance, or laboratory).' The 1955
policy did not require a high school education for transfer from labor to
coal handling.61 The Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibited Duke Power's
open preference for whites and its practice of promoting only whites out
of the labor department.
In reaction to the 1964 Act, Duke Power changed the 1955 policy.
First, Duke Power established a high school education requirement for
transfer out of the labor department.62 In 1965, most blacks lacked a
high school education.6 3 Therefore, the post-Act requirement of a high
school education to transfer out of the labor department produced the
same result as the pre-Act open preference for whites. Second, Duke
52. Griggs, 401 U.S. at 426.
53. Id. at 427-28 (requiring "satisfactory scores on two professionally prepared aptitude tests,
as well as... a high school education").
54. Id. at 427-28.
55. Id. at 426-27.
56. Id. at 426.
57. Id. at 426-27.
58. Id. at 427.
59. Id.
60. Id. (emphasis added).
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 431 n.6 (1960 census statistics showing only 12% of black males possessed a high
school education).
[Vol. 28:131
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Power required satisfactory scores on two professional aptitude tests for
initial employment in any department, except labor. 4 Since satisfactory
scores approximated the national median for high school graduates,6" the
requirement reinforced the educational advantage enjoyed by non-
blacks.66
The Supreme Court found that the practices adopted by Duke
Power after passage of the 1964 CRA operated to exclude minorities and
were not demonstrably related to job performance. According to the
Court, such practices directly conflicted with congressional purposes un-
derlying Title VII.68 Congress' objective "was to achieve equality of em-
ployment opportunities and remove barriers that have operated in the
past to favor an identifiable group of white employees over other
employees."6 9
Duke Power argued that the aptitude tests used were specifically
authorized by section 703(h) of Title VII.7 ° Section 703(h) allows the use
of "any professionally developed ability test provided that such test, its
administration or action upon results is not designed, intended or used to
discriminate because of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin."7 1
The Court gave substantial deference to guidelines issued by the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) on employment testing
procedures.72 Under the EEOC guidelines, only "job-related" tests
would be tolerated.7 3 Thus, in Title VII disparate impact suits, the fact
that the employer had no intention to discriminate when adopting a
practice is irrelevant.74 Therefore, Griggs held that an employer's only
defense to a showing of disparate impact is the "business necessity" of
the practice.75 "The touchstone is business necessity. If an employment
practice which operates to exclude Negroes cannot be shown to be re-
lated to job performance, the practice is prohibited. '76
64. Id. at 427-28.
65. Id. at 428.
66. Id. at 431 n.6.
67. Id. at 433.
68. Id. at 429.
69. Id. at 429-30.
70. Id. at 433.
71. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h). Section 2000e-2(h) only pertains to the administration of tests.
High school diploma requirements are not addressed. Id.
72. Griggs, 401 U.S. at 433-34.
73. 35 Fed. Reg. 12,333 (1970) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. § 1607) (quoted by Griggs, 401 U.S.
at 434 n.9).
74. Griggs, 401 U.S. at 431.
75. Id.
76. Id.
19921
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Subsequent Supreme Court decisions fleshed out the details of Title
VII disparate impact suits. In Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody," the
Court expanded the Griggs analysis holding that a plaintiff could rebut
evidence of business necessity by showing that there were less discrimina-
tory alternatives which satisfied the employer's legitimate employment
interests.73
In Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust Co. 79 the Court decided that
successful disparate impact suits do not require a prior history of inten-
tional discrimination.8 1 Watson further expanded the coverage of dispa-
rate impact suits by allowing attacks upon the use of subjective criteria in
hiring and promotion decisions if the subjectivity affected women or mi-
norities disproportionately.81 Prior to Watson, the Court allowed only
standardized or objective criteria to show disparate impact.8 2
The most significant aspect of Watson is the discourse in both the
plurality and minority opinions concerning the evidentiary burdens to be
borne by the parties. The question was this: once an employee proves
that certain business practices have a disparate discriminatory impact, is
the employer simply required to bear the burden of producing evidence
substantiating its assertion that the practice in question is a business ne-
cessity or, must the employer bear the heavier burden of proving that the
business practice is, in fact, a business necessity?83 Led by Justice
O'Connor, the plurality concluded that the employer must satisfy only a
burden of production. 84 Thus, if the employer proffered evidence tending
to show that the practice was a business necessity, the employee is then
responsible for proving either that the practices were not a necessity or
that less discriminatory alternative practices could be implemented in-
stead.81 In contrast, the minority, comprised of Justices Marshall, Bren-
nan, and Blackmun, would have imposed the heavier burden of proof on
the employer.86 Thus, the employer would have had to prove that its
77. 422 U.S. 405 (1975).
78. Id. at 436.
79. 487 U.S. 977 (1988).
80. Id. at 988.
81. Id. at 990-91.
82. Id. at 988-89.
83. Id. at 991.
84. Id. at 998.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 1001.
[Vol. 28:131
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practices were, in fact, necessary. 87 Since there was no majority,88 the
precedential value of Watson on this issue was questionable at best.
However, Watson drew an important line separating the Justices. In
1989, just one year later, the burden shifting issue was confronted by the
Supreme Court for a second time. The battlefield was Wards Cove Pack-
ing Co. v. Atonio.89
2. Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio
Wards Cove Packing Co, v. Atonio,9 which governed disparate im-
pact suits until the enactment of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, adopted
the Watson plurality's evidentiary conclusions. 91 Justice Kennedy, who
did not participate in Watson,9" provided the swing vote. In summary,
Wards Cove held: (1) a plaintiff carries the burden of isolating and identi-
fying the specific employment practices responsible for statistical dispari-
ties;93 (2) the burden of proof remains with a plaintiff and only a burden
of production shifts to an employer;94 and (3) an employer can meet its
production burden by relating challenged practices to legitimate business
goals.95
Civil rights advocates strongly objected to each holding in Wards
Cove. First, civil rights advocates felt disparate impact plaintiffs should
not be required to identify each specific employment practice and its dis-
parate impact.96 Rather, they argued, plaintiffs should be allowed to rely
on aggregate statistical imbalances between minority and non-minority
employees or applicants. 97 Second, civil rights advocates wanted the bur-
den of proof, rather than production, shifted to employers once a plaintiff
established a prima facie case of disparate impact.98 Unless the pur-
ported justifications are merely pretexts for discrimination, an employer
should be able to prove the business necessity of the practice. Therefore,
the civil rights advocates contended, an employer should be required to
87. Id.
88. Justice Stevens felt an analysis of shifts in burden was not necessary to decide the case. Id.
at loll.
89. 490 U.S. 642 (1989).
90. Id.
91. Watson, 487 U.S. at 977.
92. Id.
93. Wards Cove, 490 U.S. at 656.
94. Id. at 659-60.
95. Id. at 660.
96. Cathcart & Snydermnan, supra note 30, at 37.
97. Id.
98. Id.
1992]
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do more than simply articulate legitimate business reasons. Third, civil
rights advocates objected to an employer simply showing how a chal-
lenged practice served "legitimate business goals," rather than being re-
quired to meet the Griggs "business necessity" standard. 99 They argued
that if an employment practice produced a disparate impact, the practice
should be essential, not merely related, to legitimate business interests. 00
B. Evidentiary Burdens Under the 1991 CRA
1. Plaintiff's Initial Burden
The plaintiff's prima facie case must include evidence of a specific,
facially neutral employment practice which causes a discriminatory im-
pact with regard to race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.' 10 If an
employee challenges multiple employment practices, the specific dispa-
rate impact of each particular practice must be shown. 2 However, the
1991 CRA allows a plaintiff, who shows that multiple employment prac-
tices form an inseparable decision making process, to present the various
practices as one employment practice. Therefore, only one showing of
disparate impact would be required in such a case.'03 Employers can
work within the law and, at the same time, diminish their exposure to
liability by keeping various employment practices distinct and separate.
2. Employer's Subsequent Burden
Once a Title VII disparate impact plaintiff has presented the re-
quired prima facie case, an employer has two possible arguments. First,
an employer can reduce the effectiveness of the plaintiff's disparate im-
pact evidence by arguing that the plaintiff's statistics are incorrect or the
disparate impact is slight."+ If the first argument fails, an employer then
must "demonstrate that the challenged practice is job related for the po-
sition in question and consistent with business necessity."' 05 The 1991
CRA defines "demonstrate" as meeting the "burdens of production and
persuasion." 106 On this point, civil rights advocates scored a clear win.
The 1991 CRA revived Griggs °7 with regard to the burdens to be borne
99. Id. at 37-38.
100. Id.
101. 1991 CRA § 105(a), 105 Stat. at 1074.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id. § 104(m), 105 Stat. at 1074.
107. 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
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by the parties.
The 1991 CRA also restored the Griggs and pre-Wards Cove defini-
tions of "job related" and "business necessity." ' Therefore, employers
must now ensure that their employment practices are necessary and not
simply related to legitimate business goals. Civil rights advocates scored
a significant win on this point as well. Employers should begin an imme-
diate review of all employment practices with an eye toward what is es-
sential, rather than arguably permissible. 1 9 Employers who err on the
side of being overly critical of practices will substantially reduce exposure
to litigation. 110
V. RESPONSE OF BusINEss OWNERS TO THE 1991 CRA
While civil rights advocates cheer many of the changes brought
about by the 1991 CRA, business owners cringe and then retreat in an
effort to absorb what they consider potentially devastating revisions."'
In the eyes of employers, the 1991 CRA contains numerous red flags
worthy of alarm. First, the opportunity to tell the intentional discrimina-
tion story to a jury provides disgruntled employees or applicants with an
incentive to sue. 12  Second, the filing of an intentional discrimination
suit places company profits in the hands of unpredictable and emotional
jurors, rather than objective judges. 1" Third, in a survival-of-the-fittest
108. 1991 CRA § 3(2), 105 Stat. at 1071 ("The purposes of this Act are- (2) to codify the con-
cepts of 'business necessity' and 'job related' enunciated by the Supreme Court in Griggs v. Duke
Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971) and in the other Supreme Court decisions prior to Wards Cove
Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642 (1989).").
109. Stacy Adler Gordon, Civil Rights Law Bares Employers to More Litigation, Bus. INs., Dec.
9, 1991, at 1. Based on interviews conducted with leading employer defense attorneys, Ms. Gordon's
article offers helpful suggestions to employers in their efforts to comply with the 1991 CRA. First,
employers should compare existing employment practices and training procedures with the require-
ments of the 1991 CRA. Id. Second, employers should conduct employee training sessions geared
towards the prevention and reporting of sexual harassment. Id. Third, employers should utilize
alternative resolution techniques. Id. For example, employers should consider settling disputes with
employees through arbitration or mediation. Id. Significant costs can be saved by avoiding litiga-
tion. Fourth, employers should keep records which prove the nondiscriminatory nature of employ-
ment decisions. Id. The records should disclose the legitimate business reasons for each
employment decision. Id. Finally, an employer presented with an employment discrimination prob-
lem should take remedial action immediately. Id.
110. Id.
I 11. Id. Generally, employers are not able to protect themselves from employment discrimina-
tion suits through insurance coverage. Id. However, with the increased exposure to liability created
by the Civil Rights Act of 1991, employers will present new arguments in favor of employment
discrimination coverage. Id. An appeal has been made to Congress to pass legislation which would
allow insurers to offer separate policies protecting against employment discrimination suits. Id.
112. Kevin Heldman, Civil Rights" New Law Places a Greater Burden on Mid-Sized Companies
to Comply, 30 FAimELD CoUNTY Bus. J. 1 (1991).
113. Peter Romeo, Operators Tense in Wake of New Civil Rights Law, NATON's RESTAURANT
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economy, jurors now possess the power in intentional discrimination
cases to financially punish and potentially destroy companies by award-
ing punitive damages.114 Fourth, the 1991 CRA lessens the burden on
plaintiffs bringing lawsuits against respectable companies who do not in-
tentionally discriminate, but who accidentally fail to achieve a perfect,
equally-balanced work force. 15 Fifth, the 1991 CRA provides an addi-
tional incentive for frustrated employees to sue by requiring employers to
reimburse successful plaintiffs for their expert witness fees.11 6 Finally,
business owners see the pro-plaintiff changes as luring more attorneys
into the employment discrimination arena.1 17
Prior to the 1991 CRA, the ability to retain expensive, prestigious
legal counsel provided employers with a significant advantage over em-
ployees. 11 Intentional discrimination plaintiffs will now attract a higher
caliber of attorney willing and able to absorb the initial expenses of litiga-
tion and hoping to collect substantial contingency fees. Thus, employers
view the 1991 CRA as stripping management of its shields, while hand-
ing employees additional swords.
For some business owners, the worst side effect of the 1991 CRA is
the creation of quotas. 1 9 Quota-conscious employers believe the expo-
sure to disparate impact liability under the 1991 CRA forces companies
into hiring quotas.120 The quota-imposing argument envisions a com-
pany dedicated to equal employment opportunities. The labor pool uti-
lized by the hypothetical company is well-integrated. However, the
NEWS NEWSPAPER, Dec. 2, 1991, at 1. In his article, Mr. Romeo quotes Bruce Cotton, Senior Vice
President of Public Affairs for the Long John Silver's seafood chain, "When you take a trial before a
jury, the members tend to decide against corporations because they think it's some big guy with deep
pockets trying to take advantage of the little guy who's suing it." Id.
114. Heldman, supra note 111, at 1.
115. Id.
116. Id. Section 113 of the 1991 CRA amends the Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act of
1976 and Title VII in order to allow the award of expert fees to parties who prevail in litigation
under Title VII, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1981A, 1982, 1983, or 1985. Heldman, supra note 111, at 1.
Section 113 overrules Supreme Court cases refusing to allow the award of expert witness fees. Id.
See West Virginia Univ. Hosps., Inc. v. Casey, 111 S. Ct. 1138 (1991); Crawford Fittings Co. v. J.T.
Gibbons, Inc., 482 U.S. 437 (1987). While Section 113 allows the court discretion with regard to an
award of expert fees, such an award is not limited to testimonial fees but can include all expert fees
incurred throughout the pendency of the litigation. See Cathcart & Snyderman, supra note 95 and
Dole and Edwards Memoranda, 137 Cong. Rec. S 15,477, H 9,530.
117. Heldman, supra note 111, at 1.
118. Id.
119. Id. See generally Linda P. Campbell, Affirmative Action Part of Doing Business: Fears Not
Always Justified Expert Says, CHI. TRIB., Dec. 1, 1991, at C25 (concern over quotas began with the
enactment of the Civil Rights Act of 1964).
120. Heldman, supra note 111, at 1.
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company's work force remains substantially homogeneous. The hypo-
thetical disparate impact is not the result of either intentional or uninten-
tional discrimination, but merely a statistical accident.
Under the 1991 CRA, an employee or applicant may sue such a
well-intending employer simply by showing the statistical disparity and
selecting an employment practice as the cause of the disparity. 21 The
employer would then bear the burden of proving the job relatedness and
business necessity of a challenged practice.' 22 Employers preferred the
approach of the Supreme Court in Wards Cove 123 which merely placed a
burden of production on employers, rather than the heavier burden of
persuasion.124
Employers view the attachment of such a heavy burden as inher-
ently unfair, particularly in light of the difficulty of surviving in an eco-
nomic recession. An alleged victim of disparate impact discrimination
may place a noose around an employer's neck by coming forward with
very little evidence. The escape of even an innocent employer would be
quite costly.'12 For example, the best case scenario for a faultless em-
ployer would be the granting of summary judgment early in the case.
Even so, the conscientious employer would have suffered the cost and
stress of litigation. Furthermore, the possibility exists that an unmer-
itorious claim could proceed all the way to the expensive trial stage.
From the employer's perspective, the only alternative is to fill job
openings with employees who will close any statistical disparities. 126 In
other words, the 1991 CRA forces employers to use quota-conscious hir-
ing methods to avoid disparate impact claims.
Employers resent the focus quotas place on an applicant or em-
ployee's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin, as opposed to focus-
ing on qualifications. 127 Employers want to concentrate only on the
qualifications of a particular employee or applicant for a particular job.
121. Colleen McMahon, The Civil Rights Act of 1991, N.Y.L.J., Jan. 24, 1992, at 1.
122. Heldman, supra note 111, at 1.
123. 490 U.S. at 659-60 (1989).
124. Heldman, supra note 111, at 1.
125. Litigation is expensive regardless of the outcome. For example, even an ultimately non-
liable employer could incur significant attorneys fees, court costs, discovery costs, and a likely insur-
ance premium increase. Id.
126. Id.
127. Id.
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Employers consider the freedom to select only the most qualified appli-
cants essential to survival in a recessive and highly competitive econ-
omy.128 Unfortunately, the immediate result of pushing employers into a
quota-corner is increased animosity between business owners and pro-
tected individuals.129
In the eyes of civil rights advocates, the 1991 CRA bears no resem-
blance to the malevolent creature employers depict.1 30 First, according
to the advocates, a sufficient number of qualified workers capable of com-
prising an integrated work force exists in the labor market.1 31 Compa-
nies simply refuse to search for or attract workers of protected classes.
Second, companies without a history of discrimination have easily
achieved integrated and statistically balanced work forces and have ex-
perienced less exposure to liability. Employers who have historically
participated in employment discrimination and therefore lack even par-
tially integrated work forces should not complain about burden shifting
because they wove their own web.'3 2 Finally, a federal court's authority
to impose sanctions for filing frivolous lawsuits will prevent the catastro-
phe envisioned by employers. 133
VI. CONCLUSION
The obvious biases of both employers and civil rights advocates
cloud their perception of the 1991 CRA. An attempt to respond to the
1991 CRA in a truly objective and practical manner presents difficulties,
but a few certainties emerge. First, employers must recognize that the
1991 CRA raises the stakes in intentional discrimination suits, and, with
regard to disparate impact suits, the rules of the game have been altered.
Second, employers can no longer afford to employ that one manager or
supervisor who personally disagrees with the purposes and spirit of Title
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. The executive director of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People
(NAACP), Benjamin Hooks, has publicly expressed his approval of the 1991 Civil Rights Act. In an
interview conducted shortly after the enactment of the 1991 CRA, Mr. Hooks stated:
The Supreme Court, peopled by Reagan-Bush appointees in the majority, devastated gains
we thought we had made. I am glad we had the 1991 Civil Rights Bill passed and signed,
but I can't help wondering if we would not have needed it but for the backward movement
of the Supreme Court. If the Court had not absolutely moved backward, we would not
have had to restore the status quo.
Louise Sweeney, A Conversation With Benjamin Hooks on His Civil Rights Legacy, THE CHRISTIAN
ScI. MONITOR, Feb. 24, 1992, at 9.
131. Heldman, supra note 111, at 1.
132. Id.
133. Id.
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VII. Employers who are willing to risk that these managers will not ex-
press their personal beliefs in their interaction with subordinates are
gambling with a potential liability of hundreds of thousands of dollars,
which rests in the hands of jurors. Finally, an employer who refuses to
utilize only employment practices which either lack a disparate impact or
are essential to business, opens the door to lawsuits which plaintiffs' at-
torneys will be delighted to pursue. The 1991 CRA became effective No-
vember 21, 1991. The liability clock ticks for employers who fail to take
precautions.
Cami Rae Baker
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